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c. 1964/05/26

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Rec'd 5/26/19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

UN Part of Scenario

As in every major political crisis since World War II, we will have to show the world we have done everything possible to resolve the problem peacefully through the UN before resorting to stepped up U.S. military action in Southeast Asia.

Objectives:

At the UN, the U.S. will:

- (1) Give a full blown expose, similar to that presented during the Cuban missile crisis, of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia through the voice of Stevenson.
- (2) Give the Organization the opportunity to take over peacekeeping responsibilities in Southeast Asia.
- (3) Make clear the additional military steps the U.S. will take if the UN cannot act.

Expectations:

1. Cambodian-South Viet-Nam Border: We may get a UN Commission to look into the Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border situation and make recommendations on how to deal with it in the future. Otherwise, the present phase will close down without formal action.

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2. Laos:

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2. Laos: If Souvanna is willing to go ahead, we will probably get a Soviet veto of a resolution calling for UN peacekeeping machinery in Laos. We should keep open the possibility of taking this matter to the General Assembly.

3. Viet-Nam: If we have been supported in the UN on Laos, we should be able to defend our position with reasonable effectiveness at the UN and avoid condemnatory or inhibitory action.

Parliamentary Situation:

A. Cambodia:

We will close out the present Cambodian complaint against South Viet-Nam in a bout a week. A UN Commission to look into the border situation and to make recommendations to alleviate the problem may result. We hope this Commission could weigh the possibility of an effective UN force on the border to avoid future incidents.

B. Laos:

If a Geneva conference cannot be convened on Souvanna's terms and/or the Pathet Lao continue their offensive, we should press Souvanna to take his case to the Security Council. Such a move by a neutralist would have a strong legal basis and stands the best chance of getting maximum support in the UN and will

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help justify stepped up military action by the U.S. if the UN does not act. We can assume Souvanna would be prepared to go to the UN, rather than back down himself or face an impasse.

In Stevenson's speeches, we would broaden the issue to major North Vietnamese aggression against South Viet-Nam showing the total threat from the North to Southeast Asia. We would point the finger at Hanoi, as we did over the Cambodia matter, but would not use stacks of new evidence or otherwise make a federal case of it. What we did would be a trailer for things to come.

But in order to get the largest possible vote in the Security Council, the resolution would be confined to Laos. Souvanna and key Security Council members would almost certainly resist enlarging the resolution to Viet-Nam and such key questions as the use of the corridor.

We would seek:

(a) Condemnation of the Communist violations of the Geneva Accords;

(b) Withdrawal of Communist forces to previous positions;

(c) A UN force to protect the territorial integrity, political independence and neutrality of Laos. (Most politically credible and immediately available force would contain units from the US, USSR, UK, and France, costs to be borne by them); and

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(d) Endorsement

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SOUVANNAS

(d) Endorsement of a Geneva Conference if ~~the~~ conditions are met.

Souvanna's full support to the above is essential. We could expect favorable votes from: US, UK, China, Bolivia, Brazil, and Norway. France's own vote and its influence over Morocco and the Ivory Coast will determine whether we will have a majority vote. Czechoslovakia would be against and the Soviets are likely to veto.

Such an outcome would provide the best possible justification for subsequent U.S. military action against the North to protect both Laos and South Viet-Nam.

If we get a good majority in the Security Council, we should consider going on to an emergency special General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. As in the Security Council, there would be maximum support for an anti-Communist stand, particularly since the complainant would be a small, neutral country. (We could devise a tactic to defer the Article 19 problem to the regular session of the General Assembly in November.)

South Viet-Nam:

Ideally any military action against the North would be taken in the context of prior substantial UN support of a Laotian complaint on Communist aggression. In such circumstances, we should be able to avoid any effort in the UN to condemn or inhibit

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inhibit our action.

However, if such military action is taken without the benefit of a prior UN debate on Laos, we will encounter more difficulties. Many members will view strikes against North Viet-Nam as aggression.

We would demonstrate the extent of North Vietnamese support for the war in the South (using additional evidence which we would save from any Laos case). Nevertheless, there would be a widespread tendency to oppose carrying the war to the North, largely because of fear a major conflict with Communist China.

If we do not take the problem to the UN, someone else is sure to do so. Therefore, we should pre-empt the situation by going to the Security Council first. In fact, we have an obligation to report to the Security Council before taking any such action.

As in Lebanon and Cuba, we would not ask for any special action, but would say that the situation was no longer tolerable and we are preparing to act, but would stop our action at any time that the UN was able to handle the situation. It would be a justification exercise, of a sort now well understood in the UN on a major East-West issue.

In the SC, we should be able to prevent a majority vote for a resolution calling on us not to intervene militarily.

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We would, however, have to be prepared to cope with substantial pressure for a political solution through a Geneva Conference on South Viet-Nam.

We also cannot rule out the possibility of a special CA being called by the Communists or certain so-called neutralists to request both sides to cease and desist from military actions which would tend to inhibit us.

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